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Introduction 
In this essay I am concerned with drawing instructive parallels 
between the justifications of a principle of neutrality that occur in 
John Rawls 's political liberalism and in John Stuart Mill 's 
substantive liberalism. For both Rawls and Mill, the principle of 
neutrality is meant to be a crucial part of the claim to legitimacy 
for their preferred state. I begin with some brief comments about 
(1) the problem of political legitimacy as it is understood by modem 
political philosophers and (2) the concept of neutrality and how it 
is readily suggested by the modern formulation of the problem of 
political legitimacy. Next, I show how the theories of Rawls and 
Mill share striking structural similarity in terms of their justification 
of a principle of neutrality. Moreover, there are points at which the 
structure of the principle of neutrality is in important respects the 
same for both philosophers. However, once the parallels are drawn 
we can isolate the important dissimilarity of these views. On the 
basis of the distinguishing features of the two approaches, it is 
argued that there is good reason to reject that of Rawls. 
The Problem of Political Legitimacy and the Role of Neutrality 
The spirit of tolerance and disdain for coercive force are crucial 
motivators of modern politics and social structuring. A person 
would be hard-pressed to find—either within the literature of 
modern political philosophy or amongst the citizens of our modern 
society—any argument that is taken seriously that suggests that 
the basis of a state's legitimacy has nothing to do with the acceptance 
(or acceptability) of that state by its (would-be) subjects. Even 
amongst philosophers who are sharply critical of "contract theories" 
there is an acknowledgment that a state is not legitimate when its 
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presence could be maintained only by coercive force against its 
subjects. It is also widely acknowledged that amongst the citizens 
of a modern state there will be a wide range of actually held and 
reasonable conceptions of the "good life." Together, this suggests 
that the legitimacy of a modern state hinges on its being acceptable 
to a citizenry that is marked by diversity. The task for modern 
political philosophers has been to develop a conception of politics 
and political institutions that passes this test for legitimacy. Many 
of the favored candidate conceptions have relied on various 
formulations of a principle of neutrality. Making such a principle 
a central feature of one's political theory seems obvious once the 
problem of political legitimacy is understood in this way. 
Neutrality' is sought under the condition of perceived 
disagreements of judgment. The judgments, moreover, need to be 
judgments of value or judgments of states of affairs where the judge 
values being right (is not indifferent to his making a correct 
judgment or not). A final condition for the seeking of neutrality is 
that there is recognized a legitimacy to each of the discrepant 
judgments so that it is decided that each of the judgments are, in 
some sense, rightfully made and endured. The legitimacy of 
discrepant judgments is grounded in the supposition that either (a) 
there can be more than one right judgment made, (b) there is no 
right or wrong judgment to be made in the matter, or (c) there is a 
sufficient degree of uncertainty regarding the matter being judged 
that it is deemed unwarranted to label one of the judgments 
illegitimate. Liberal political theorists find these conditions present 
in human affairs and thus advance political theories that strive 
towards neutrality. 
The classic and perhaps original moment of liberal neutrality 
involves the case for religious toleration. In the face of stark 
disagreements between different segments of the population 
regarding matters of religion, liberals came to argue that the state 
cannot rightfully endorse or institutionalize a particular judgment 
or set of judgments on these matters (where such endorsement 
would involve mandating that all citizens accept these judgments). 
Because of the passionate commitment individuals have to their 
religious beliefs and because the final truth of these matters is so 
difficult to settle in any way that satisfies all parties, the state that 
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is to govern these individuals must remain neutral with respect to 
judgments of religion. 
Diversity in religious views, however, is far from being the 
only diversity found amongst members of modern society. Citizens 
of modern states vary racially and ethnically, from region to region, 
along the lines of economic class, as a result of membership in 
different voluntary organizations, and out of natural human 
idiosyncrasies. We are diverse in what we value and we value 
things differently because of our diversity. Many of the differing 
judgments of value found in a diverse citizenry are held quite dearly 
to those who make the judgments. In many cases the judgments of 
value are partly constitutive of the citizens' individual self-
conceptions. A judgment of value is partly constitutive of a citizen's 
individual self-conception whenever it is the case that if the citizen 
were to be asked to state the features that make her the distinct 
person she is, she would not be able to do so in any way that she 
would find sufficiently comprehensive without some reference to 
her holding these judgments of value. There exists, in modern 
society, a tremendous variety of these judgments. However, even 
where such judgments differ they are frequently each regarded as 
legitimate because they are judgments that (a) can each be right, 
(b) can't be right or wrong, or (c) because they are judgments the 
truth of which is not satisfactorily established. Given their 
legitimacy, liberal theorists maintain that the state is to remain 
neutral with respect to them. 
The Justification of Neutrality: General Strategies 
So, we seek neutrality in our politics and our political theorizing 
in part because we are aware of the reasonable disagreement 
between citizens of our modern society regarding judgments of 
value. Something tells us that a neutral stance is the right stance to 
take in such a situation. But what makes it right? In many instances, 
a course of action or particular policy is justified on the grounds 
that the action or policy will promote some value. In this situation, 
however, this mode of justification presents us with some difficulty. 
After all, what it is that we are trying to justify is neutrality and this 
neutrality is with respect to different values. When you justify 
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some policy on the basis of some value it promotes it is hardly the 
case that the policy is neutral with respect to that justificatory value. 
For those theorists who are committed to a strong formulation 
of the "priority of the right" thesis, there is thought to be a preferable 
alternative mode of justification. That which is right, say such 
theorists, is never given its justification on the basis of its promotion 
of any good. Right is right whether it promotes or hinders the good 
or even if, as a matter of circumstance, it has positively harmful 
consequences. For these theorists, the principle of neutrality might 
best be understood as either an alternative formulation of the priority 
of right thesis or the supreme principle recommended by it. The 
motivation behind the assertion of the priority of the right is a 
powerful one. By separating the right from any independent notion 
of the good, morality (which is concerned with the right) can be 
understood as unconditionally binding: necessary rather than 
contingent. Ronald Dworkin's thought is the best example of a 
neutralist liberalism committed to the strong formulation of the 
priority of the right thesis. Exactly how this alternative mode of 
justification is to be understood is difficult to make clear. While I 
acknowledge the significance of this alternative in the history of 
addressing this problem, it is not one I shall consider more in this 
paper. 
Making a distinction between types of value is a general strategy 
shared by two distinct sorts of neutralist liberals in dealing with 
the problem of justifying neutrality. Distinguishing between types 
of value is supposed to reveal how it is that there is no incoherence 
involved with relying on values for the justification of the principle 
that demands neutrality towards conceptions of value. The 
neutrality defended is to be understood as being with respect to 
values of type A. This neutrality is not threatened when it is justified 
on the basis of values of type B. 
The Strategy Employed: Mill and Rawls 
One version of this general approach is found in the work of 
John Stuart Mill. Mill maintained that happiness is the one supreme 
good and, thus, that we ought to maximize the amount of happiness 
in the world. He further understood human nature to be such that 
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true happiness consists in living autonomously. Mill, in some of 
the most eloquent passages of On Liberty, forcefully praises original 
(self) expression as the central component of a good human life. 
Liberty ought to be defended, argues Mill, not only because it is a 
necessary condition for our being able to finally discover and 
rightfully appreciate significant and elusive truths about the world, 
but also on the basis of an already recognized truth: individuality, 
'peculiarity of taste,' and 'eccentricity of conduct,' are essential 
components of human flourishing and happiness. Mill understood 
neutrality as necessary with respect to the variety of ways persons 
can lead their lives such that they manifest the recognized good for 
humans. There was no need to be neutral regarding competing 
understandings of supreme value, but rather only regarding the 
variety of life-plans through which the one supreme value might 
be realized. The diversity that must be respected by the states 
adopting a neutral stance is a diversity of ways of living that are 
each constitutive of the supreme good. The two types of good for 
Mill, then, are (1) the supreme good of happiness understood as 
autonomous living and (2) the good of lives lived such as to realize 
the supreme good. The latter good is plural in its nature and it is 
with respect to this plurality that the state ought to remain neutral. 
This neutrality is justified, however, on the grounds that each of 
the allowable plans of life constituting this plurality have in common 
their being realizations of the supreme good. 
Most deontologically minded political theorists like Rawls want 
to distance themselves from this Millean way of establishing the 
legitimacy of the state because they understand Mill's supreme value 
- the one that justifies his version of neutrality - as being itself 
controversial. Insofar as there can be reasonable disagreement with 
respect to Mill's understanding of what is of supreme value as well 
as with respect to what might best lead to the realization of that 
value we have reason to seek out an even more comprehensive 
neutrality. So Mill would apparently fail to be neutral enough for 
Rawls. But Rawls thinks that neutrality is somehow the appropriate 
expression of justice as fairness and that certain types of good supply 
the justification for justice as fairness. Thus Rawls, like Mill, is to 
be understood as employing the general strategy described above 
for justifying neutrality. For Rawls, though, the distinction between 
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types of value is quite different from that found in Mill. 
The Rawlsian distinction claims that on the one hand we have 
"value" understood in the sense of principles of right. These sorts 
of values, call them political values, place limits on the ways in 
which citizens are able to act in pursuing their own ends. Autonomy, 
tolerance and equality are paradigm examples of such values for 
liberals. To this list, Rawls adds (among others) goodness as 
rationality, primary goods, and the good of a well-ordered society. 
These are values in that the limits they set provide a level playing 
field for the members of a diverse citizenry. On the other hand we 
have "value" understood as that which serves as an end for citizens. 
This latter sense of value is what makes the good in a given 
conception of the good life. Values of this sort, call them personal 
values, are the source of difference in a pluralistic society. Rawls's 
liberal argument for neutrality, then, is the argument for a political 
theory that defends a model of the state that is neutral with respect 
to personal value. The justification of this neutrality is made on 
the basis of political values. According to Rawls, the principle of 
neutrality in political theory is the expression of the priority of 
right.2 However, his formulation of the thesis of the priority of 
right is a weak formulation since it allows for the use of political 
values in a justificatory role. Strong formulations of the thesis 
reject the use of any conception of the good in such a justificatory 
role. 
The Structure of the Principle of Neutrality 
The /70/z-neutral state, given Rawls's view, is one which bases 
its political decisions on some particular comprehensive conception 
of the good life (personal value) and thereby eschews any 
acknowledgment of the priority of the right. From Rawls's neutralist 
liberal perspective, given the diversity of actually held conceptions 
of the good life, citizens are not treated fairly whenever some 
preferred conception informs and justifies the character of the state. 
A neutral state on the other hand avoids making any of its decisions 
for the reason that the decision will promote some such conception 
of the good and thereby treats its diverse citizens fairly. 
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This is one of a variety of ways to sharpen the vague concept 
of neutrality. Rawls, for example, distinguishes between procedural 
neutrality and neutrality of aim. These are specified in the following 
way. Neutrality might be understood as involving a procedure (say 
for establishing principles to abide by in some endeavor - like 
creating a just society) that is justified on the basis of no values at 
all or on the basis of values shared by and thus neutral between all 
whose interests will be affected by the procedure. Neutrality might 
also be understood in terms of aims (say of the institutions and 
policies of a state). A policy is neutral in its aims when the reasons 
for which it is put into place do not include its promoting or being 
likely to promote some particular comprehensive conception of 
the good .3 Rawls's "justice as fairness" is understood as neutral in 
both of these senses. It is procedurally neutral: 
...in virtue of its being a political conception that 
aims to be the focus of an overlapping consensus. 
That is, the view as a whole hopes to articulate a 
public basis of justification for the basic structure 
of a const i tut ional regime working from 
fundamental intuitive ideas implicit in the public 
poli t ical cul ture and abstract ing from 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines. 4 
Justice as fairness: 
...also hopes to satisfy neutrality of aim in the sense 
that the basic institutions and public policy are not 
to be designed to favor any comprehensive 
doctrine.'5 
Justice as fairness is understood in terms of the central commitment 
to neutrality in the sense of neutrality of aim. It is itself given a 
neutral justification that takes the form of a procedural neutrality. 
There is a clear sense in which we can further understand Mill's 
approach as parallel to that of Rawls. Mill's conception of justice 
involves a commitment to a principle of neutrality demanding that 
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the state not favor some particular way of life. Thus, he is defending 
neutrality understood in a way that is structurally similar to that of 
Rawls's neutrality of aim. 6 However, whereas the neutrality of 
aim in Rawls's theory is a neutrality with respect to comprehensive 
conceptions of the good, that which is found in Mill's theory is 
with respect to those plans of life that are understood as being 
realizations of the summum honum. We can also understand Mill's 
defense of this neutrality as a species of procedural neutrality, 
although to do so we must interpret that conception of neutrality in 
a way that Rawls does not. The conception of procedural neutrality, 
recall, is a conception understood as involving a procedure that is 
justified on the basis of no values at all or on the basis of values 
shared by and thus neutral between all whose interests will be 
effected by the procedure. As Rawls understands this notion of 
neutrality, to speak of some value(s) as shared and thus neutral is 
to speak of values that are actually, commonly held or consciously 
acknowledged. In order to characterize Mill's defense of neutrality 
with respect to plans of life as involving a species of procedural 
neutrality we must allow that the crucial sharing of values needn't 
involve common acknowledgment. To say that the justificatory 
value Mill relies on (the summum bonum) is neutral because shared 
is to say that this value is a value for everyone equally whether 
they acknowledge this fact or not.7 Thus, the value that Mill refers 
to in order to justify his principle of neutrality of aim (the summum 
bonum of happiness understood as consisting in autonomous living) 
is, from within Mill's approach, neutral because it is the supreme 
value for everyone. 
The Dissimilarity of the Two Theories 
The distinction, drawn by Rawls, between personal and political 
value is not meant to be understood as (like Mill's) a distinction 
between the summum bonum conceived in abstraction and the 
various, particular life plans which instantiate the summum bonum. 
Liberals who rely on the personal / political value distinction wish 
to distance their political theories from a commitment to any claim 
about the intrinsic or supreme value of anything. Instead, the key 
to this distinction lies (at least in part) in the understanding of 
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political values as being (relatively or sufficiently) uncontroversial 
whereas personal values are the subject of a great deal of reasonable 
controversy. The concept of political values, as values that set limits 
on the ways in which citizens can pursue personal values such that 
each enjoys fair opportunity in their pursuit, is meant to be a 
conception of values that will ideally be acknowledged by all 
citizens. These values, it is claimed, are already neutral values 
because no matter what the personal values a person might hold, 
she will recognize the political values as at least consistent with 
and at best positively beneficial to the realization of her personal 
values. In Rawls's language, the political values are understood as 
those that would be found in an overlapping consensus of divergent 
comprehensive conceptions of the good. 
There are, though, considerations that require that the Rawlsian 
account (as I have presented it thus far) incorporate significant 
qualifications and in fact Rawls himself recognizes this. Yet, once 
it is conceded that these qualifications are necessary, it starts to 
become apparent that the political values are (in one important 
sense) no more comprehensively neutral than is Mill's summum 
bonum. Once we appreciate this, we are in a better position to 
judge the crucial difference between Rawls's political liberalism 
and Mill's substantive liberalism. This crucial difference, I shall 
maintain, is not one that rightly recommends Rawls's approach. 
In order to understand the necessary qualifications of the 
Rawlsian account and the consequences that follow from these, it 
is instructive to consider the conception of the good for humans 
that Mill took to be most antithetical to his own preferred 
conception. The conception I am referring to is the "Calvinistic 
theory," according to which: 
...the one great offence of man is self-will. All the 
good of which humanity is capable is comprised 
in obedience. You have no choice; thus you must 
do, and not otherwise: 'whatever is not a duty, is a 
sin'. Human nature being radically corrupt, there 
is no redemption for any one until human nature 
is killed within him. To one holding this theory of 
life, crushing out any of the human faculties, 
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capacities and susceptibilities, is no evil: man 
needs no capacity, but that of surrendering himself 
to the will of God: and if he uses any of his faculties 
for any other purpose but to do that supposed will 
more effectually, he is better without them. 8 
If we assume that, in addition to the above characterization, this 
conception also understands general obedience as necessary for 
the realization of the good (so that I am not satisfied just so long as 
/ avoid exercising my capacities but only when this avoidance 
characterizes the population generally) we could conclude that this 
conception is not going to contain within it an acceptance of the 
political values on the basis of which (for Rawls) the principle of 
neutrality is defended. 
From within the "Calvinistic theory," the disagreement about 
the nature of the good, which is a distinguishing characteristic of 
modern society, will not be regarded as a reasonable disagreement. 
The "fact of pluralism" will be rejected as something towards which 
societies ought to be accommodating. The very idea of concerning 
oneself with the problem of trying to make the character of the 
state such that it is acceptable to some variety of heathens is an 
affront to this conception. The political values Rawls relies on: 
goodness as rationality, political virtues, the good of the well ordered 
society (to name three), are each understood in terms that locate 
them equally within the variety of heathen comprehensive 
conceptions of the good that is constitutive of the fact of pluralism. 
Understood in these terms, these political values will not be located 
within the Calvinistic theory. For example, Rawls begins with the 
presupposition that the "fact of pluralism" which characterizes 
modern societies is a fact that ought to be accommodated. The 
plurality, moreover, that he wishes to accommodate is a plurality 
of reasonable comprehensive conceptions of the good. One of the 
political values that he relies on to justify his neutrality of aim is 
the idea of goodness as rationality. Rawls must understand (given 
that he accepts a plurality of reasonable comprehensive conceptions 
of the good) rationality as being consistent with substantive 
disagreement about how humans are to lead their lives. If this is to 
be a part of the content of the conception of rationality, the Calvinist 
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is not going to recognize rationality as a good but rather as a primary 
source of evil. However, if the Calvinist understands rationality as 
a good he will not see it as a general trait of humans that is shared 
equally by persons who are in disagreement about what is valuable 
in human life. It follows that the political value of goodness as 
rationality is not neutral with respect to all actual (let alone possible) 
comprehensive conceptions of the good. There are some 
conceptions that simply do not share in the overlap in which the 
political values are located. This is not something of which Rawls 
is unaware, nor does he find this to be a problem for his theory. 
Why is it that the Calvinistic theory, for example, is not one 
towards which our state should be neutral? For Rawls the answer 
lies in its not being one of the permissible comprehensive 
conceptions. But what is it that determines the permissibility and 
impermissibility of a conception? The answer to this is that a 
conception is permissible in as much as it contains respect for the 
principles of justice. This is to say that those conceptions that 
overlap in just the right way are permissible in virtue of their 
overlapping as they do and those that are not a part of the overlap 
are impermissible in virtue of their failing to have any significant 
part in common with the rest. Thus the Calvinistic conception is 
an impermissible conception since it does not recognize the political 
values that are necessary for Rawls's justification of his principle 
of neutrality of aim. It might be thought that this circularity is a 
great problem for Rawls's account. Rawls instead thinks that the 
circularity is not a problem since parameters are already set for his 
political conception of justice by certain historical facts constitutive 
of the subject of his theory. Given that his theory is to be one for a 
modern, western, constitutional democratic regime, Rawls has no 
problem with accepting that certain comprehensive conceptions of 
the good - those, like the Calvinist theory, that are in important 
respects incompatible with the constitutional democratic regime -
are ruled out right from the start. 
Notice, though, that the neutrality Rawls establishes for his 
theory comes with a high price tag. Rawls argues that the reliance 
on certain conceptions of good (political good) for a justification 
of justice as fairness does not entail that justice as fairness is a 
form of perfectionism. The way he avoids this conclusion is through 
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a characterization of the truth condition for the claims to goodness 
as involving only their actual acceptance within a certain socio-
cultural environment. 
We can see this (that reliance on these ideas of the 
good needn't lead to perfectionism) once we are 
clear about the polit ical concept ion of 
justice...ideas of the good may freely be introduced 
so long as they are political ideas, that is, so long 
as they belong to a reasonable political conception 
of justice for a constitutional regime. This allows 
us to assume that they are shared by citizens and 
do not depend on any particular comprehensive 
doctrine. 9 
To say that it is true that these goods are goods depends not at all 
on some comprehensive doctrine establishing the case since it is to 
say nothing more than that these goods are accepted as goods by 
the sorts of citizens who make up the state being structured. The 
Calvinistic theory of the good will not thrive but this fact does not 
suggest any culpable failure to be neutral since for any state some 
conceptions will not fit in. This is an unavoidable consequence. 
Another way of avoiding the circularity of defining permissible 
and impermissible conceptions of the good would be to opt instead 
for an account of the impermissibility of a comprehensive 
conception as grounded in the conception's being inconsistent with 
or positively in opposition to the summum bonum. This is the way 
in which impermissible conceptions are understood in the Millean 
theory. The only advantage over this Millean approach that Rawls 
could be understood to have gained in his political liberalism is the 
advantage of not having to defend the truth of any claim as to the 
value of something, say that of autonomy, in any sense stronger 
than its being actually valued in common by the relevant group of 
persons. 
Both of these theories, as it turns out, are neutral only to a 
limited range. Neither Rawls's nor Mill's theory is going to be 
neutral in any sense of the word with respect to, say, the Calvinistic 
Theory. In this respect, Rawls has not established a theory that is 
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preferable because more comprehensively neutral than the theory 
offered by Mill. In addition, we must understand Rawls as accepting 
that the defense of an entire political theory is to be made on grounds 
of its actual acceptance only.' 0 From this, it follows that if we are 
to agree with him we are forced to admit that there is no defense of 
a liberal conception of justice outside of the specific socio-cultural 
environment found in modern western countries. This too, I am 
convinced, does not afford political liberalism any advantage over 
substantive liberalism. 
It might be argued that for all practical purposes, the possibility 
- afforded by a Millean theory - of a defense of liberalism 
irrespective of socio-cultural conditions is of limited worth at best. 
This line of reasoning maintains that, given that there is little to no 
hope of convincing Calvinists (or other extreme fundamentalists) 
of the independent truth of the summum bonum as Mill sees it, 
there is no actual gain to be had in endorsing a Millean theory. 
When you combine the appreciation of this fact with the 
acknowledgment that within a liberal culture, Rawls theory might 
be understood as neutral in a way that Mill's is not (since it relies 
on no claims as to the intrinsic or supreme value of anything) you 
discover reason to prefer the Rawlsian approach. But is this right? 
I think that the answer depends on how you view the difference 
between how it is that a state that embodies political liberalism and 
one that embodies substantive liberalism respond to those Calvinists 
(or would-be Calvinists) among its ranks. Both states will be 
entirely non-neutral regarding the Calvinists and as a result the 
Calvinists will not flourish in either. Actually, the Calvinists will 
have a miserable existence in either state since they will be 
surrounded by heathens and governed by a state that encourages 
heathenism. The difference is that within the Rawlsian state the 
Calvinists will be told that heathenism is exalted - to their demise 
- not because heathenism is thought right, but only because it is 
what the heathen majority wants. Since there is no reference to the 
independent truth of heathenism supporting the Rawlsian state, the 
arguments made by the Calvinists against this truth will be 
completely ignored as irrelevant." In the Millean state, on the 
other hand, the Calvinists will be told that their demise is grounded 
in the truth of heathenism and in this there is at least some voice 
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afforded to the Calvinists. Their arguments may not be convincing 
in the substantively liberal state but they will not be seen as 
irrelevant and therefore out of place in political debate. This, I 
want to suggest, is an advantage for the Millean theory. 
Finally, if Mill's substantive liberalism is ultimately to be 
preferred, this will be on the basis of reasons that are as independent 
of these practical considerations as possible. If Mill is right this 
will be because there is such a thing as the summum bonum and he 
understands it correctly. Mill's rightness will not be grounded 
merely in the fact that his state affords some minimal amount of 
respect towards those who fail to appreciate the summum bonum. 
If Rawls's account is to be preferred, however, it seems unavoidable 
that this can only be on the basis of practical advantages since Rawls 
so strongly eschews any justification grounded in the independent 
truth of any claims to goodness. Once we come to realize that 
there are no decisive practical advantages to Rawls's political 
liberalism, there seems to be nothing left to recommend it. 
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